

NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND
MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24

FILED BY CLERK

APR 19 2010

COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION TWO

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF ARIZONA
DIVISION TWO

THE STATE OF ARIZONA,)	2 CA-CR 2009-0101
)	DEPARTMENT B
Appellee,)	
)	<u>MEMORANDUM DECISION</u>
v.)	Not for Publication
)	Rule 111, Rules of
TAMMI MARIE EDMONDS,)	the Supreme Court
)	
Appellant.)	
_____)	

APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PIMA COUNTY

Cause No. CR-20083378

Honorable Teresa Godoy, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

Terry Goddard, Arizona Attorney General
By Kent E. Cattani and Joseph L. Parkhurst

Tucson
Attorneys for Appellee

Robert J. Hirsh, Pima County Public Defender
By M. Edith Cunningham

Tucson
Attorneys for Appellant

B R A M M E R, Judge.

¶1 Appellant Tammi Marie Edmonds was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of forgery and sentenced to a substantially-mitigated, one-year prison term for each count, to be served concurrently. She has filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶2 Counsel has filed a brief in compliance with *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), avowing she has reviewed the entire record and found no arguable issue to raise on appeal. In compliance with *State v. Clark*, 196 Ariz. 530, ¶ 32, 2 P.3d 89, 97 (App. 1999), counsel has also provided “a detailed factual and procedural history of the case with citations to the record, [so] this court can satisfy itself that counsel has in fact thoroughly reviewed the record.” Pursuant to our obligation under *Anders*, we have reviewed the record in its entirety and are satisfied it supports counsel’s recitation of the facts. Edmonds has not filed a supplemental brief.

¶3 Viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the jury’s verdicts, *see State v. Tamplin*, 195 Ariz. 246, ¶ 2, 986 P.2d 914, 914 (App. 1999), the evidence established that the manager of a retail market telephoned the police after he doubted the authenticity of a seven-hundred-fifty-dollar business check Edmonds had presented for payment. Tucson police officer Bradley Miller interviewed Edmonds after advising her of her rights pursuant to *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and she told him she worked for the business that had issued the check, but had been unable to recall the location of her employer or her hourly rate of pay. Edmonds was arrested after another officer telephoned the business that purportedly had issued the check. Miller then found another large check, showing the same business as payor and Edmonds as payee, in Edmonds’s possession during a search incident to the arrest. At trial, an accountant for

the business testified Edmonds never had been employed there and that the checks in question were not legitimate.

¶4 We conclude substantial evidence established all elements necessary to support Edmonds's convictions, *see* A.R.S. § 13-2002(A)(2), (3), and her sentences are within the authorized range. *See* former A.R.S. § 13-702.01(B), 2006 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 148, § 2.¹ In our examination of the record pursuant to *Anders*, we have found no reversible error and no arguable issue warranting further appellate review. *See Anders*, 386 U.S. at 744. Accordingly, we affirm Edmonds's convictions and sentences.

/s/ J. William Brammer, Jr.

J. WILLIAM BRAMMER, JR., Judge

CONCURRING:

/s/ Peter J. Eckerstrom

PETER J. ECKERSTROM, Presiding Judge

/s/ Garye L. Vásquez

GARYE L. VÁSQUEZ, Judge

¹The Arizona criminal sentencing code has been renumbered, effective "from and after December 31, 2008." *See* 2008 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 301, §§ 1-120. We refer in this decision to the section number in effect at the time of the offenses in this case.